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Human perception, cognition, and action requires fast integration of bottom-up
signals with top-down knowledge and context. A key theoretical perspective in
cognitive science is the interactive activation hypothesis: forward and backward flow in
bidirectionally connected neural networks allows humans and other biological systems
to approximate optimal integration of bottom-up and top-down information under real-
world constraints. An alternative view is that online feedback is neither necessary
nor helpful; purely feed forward alternatives can be constructed for any feedback
system, and online feedback could not improve processing and would preclude veridical
perception. In the domain of spoken word recognition, the latter view was apparently
supported by simulations using the interactive activation model, TRACE, with and
without feedback: as many words were recognized more quickly without feedback as
were recognized faster with feedback, However, these simulations used only a small
set of words and did not address a primary motivation for interaction: making a model
robust in noise. We conducted simulations using hundreds of words, and found that the
majority were recognized more quickly with feedback than without. More importantly, as
we added noise to inputs, accuracy and recognition times were better with feedback
than without. We follow these simulations with a critical review of recent arguments
that online feedback in interactive activation models like TRACE is distinct from other
potentially helpful forms of feedback. We conclude that in addition to providing the
benefits demonstrated in our simulations, online feedback provides a plausible means of
implementing putatively distinct forms of feedback, supporting the interactive activation
hypothesis.
Keywords: psycholinguistics, spoken word recognition, computational models, speech perception, Bayesian
models, simulations
INTRODUCTION
A central question in cognitive science is how sensory data should be integrated with prior
knowledge. Bi-directional (i.e., bottom-up and top-down) information flow is one solution. Such
“interactive activation” allows early and continuous access to prior knowledge, which can tune
perceptual systems to prior and conditional probabilities based on experience (MacDonald et al.,
1994; Knill and Richards, 1996; McClelland et al., 2006). In addition to providing a basis for
effects of top-down knowledge, feedback provides an efficient means for resolving ambiguous,
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noisy, or obscured inputs (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981).
McClelland et al. (2014) describe this interactive activation
hypothesis very clearly:
Interactive activation hypothesis. Implementation of perceptual
and other cognitive processes within bidirectionally connected
neural networks in the brain provides the mechanism that
addresses the key computational challenges facing perceptual
systems, and it gives rise to the approximate conformity of
human performance to optimal perceptual inference in real
time (p. 6).
An alternative view holds that feedback cannot improve
performance, feedback only accounts for effects of top-down
knowledge, and bottom-up and top-down information can be
more effectively integrated without feedback (e.g., Norris et al.,
2000; see Figure 1 for schematics of interactive and autonomous
models). In the specific case of spoken word recognition,
proponents of such “autonomous” or “modular” views have
asserted that feedback is not necessary and, furthermore, could
never help word recognition – and might in fact hinder it. As
Norris et al. (2000) put it:
The best performance that could possibly be expected from a
word recognition system is to reliably identify the word whose
lexical representation best matches the input representation.
This may sound trivially obvious, but it highlights the fact that
a recognition system that simply matched the perceptual input
against each lexical entry, and then selected the entry with
the best fit, would provide an optimal means of performing
isolated word recognition (independent of any higher-level
contextual constraints), limited only by the accuracy of the
representations. Adding activation feedback from lexical nodes
to the input nodes (whether phonemic or featural) could
not possibly improve recognition accuracy at the lexical level
(p. 301).
FIGURE 1 | Schematics of autonomous (Left) and interactive (Right) models
of spoken word recognition. In autonomous models, lexical effects result from
post-perceptual integration of perceptual and lexical substrates. In interactive
models, lexical effects on phonological-level behavior result from direct
influence of lexical knowledge on perceptual substrates. The large arrows
delimit the scope of most current models, which are concerned primarily with
mapping an abstract representation of the speech signal (phonemes, or in the
case of TRACE, distributed features over time) to word forms.
Norris et al. (2016) reiterate their arguments (Norris et al.,
2000) against feedback in interactive activation models (IAMs),
but also make a strong case that there are other kinds of feedback
that could benefit processing. They use the term “activation
feedback” to refer to feedback in IAMs and argue that it differs
qualitatively from helpful forms of feedback, such as feedback for
learning, feedback for attentional control, of feedback in service
of generative models such as predictive coding. In our “General
Discussion,” we will critically review their taxonomy of feedback
types and the claim that activation feedback stands alone as
a theoretically unhelpful form of feedback. First, though, it is
crucial to put the claim that feedback cannot benefit recognition
to the test.
Norris et al. (2000) bolstered the argument that activation
feedback cannot benefit performance by citing a set of
simulations reported by Frauenfelder and Peeters (1998; FP98
from here on) using the interactive-activation TRACE model
(McClelland and Elman, 1986). In these simulations, feedback
modified phonemic processing, but it did not have a “general
beneficial effect on word recognition.” FP98 compared the time
it took a target word in TRACE to reach an activation threshold
with feedback set to the default level or turned off (set to 0.0;
their Simulation 5). They compared recognition times (RTs) for
a set of 21 words that had been chosen for other simulations.
The expectation was that feedback would speed recognition,
since the bottom-up input should be amplified by recurrence
via top-down connections. However, FP98 found that about half
their items were recognized more quickly without feedback than
with feedback. The implication would seem to be that feedback
in TRACE is a mechanism added simply to account for top-
down effects, rather than a mechanism serving a useful purpose
(benefiting recognition) from which top-down effects emerge.
Further, if the interactive architecture in TRACE serves no helpful
function, this would raise doubts about the plausibility of a
helpful, let alone necessary, role of feedback.
However, the FP98 simulation does not address the crucial
issue of whether feedback makes a model robust under degraded
conditions, such as the presence of external or internal noise
(McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; McClelland and Elman,
1986). Primary characteristics of parallel distributed processing
systems include graceful degradation under cases of noisy,
distorted, obscured, or otherwise incomplete inputs (McClelland
et al., 1986). Noise is a crucial ecological consideration, given
considerable internal noise in neural systems and the variable
(and often literally noisy) conditions under which speech is
experienced (see extended discussion in McClelland and Elman,
1986). Here, we test the possibility that the apparent failure of
activation feedback to benefit processing in TRACE stems from
the failure to test the model in conditions where bottom-up
information does not perfectly identify a lexical target – that is,
under conditions of noise. We will also consider the possibility
that the result may not generalize beyond the 21-word subset
of the TRACE lexicon FP98 tested. A benefit of feedback in
TRACE simulations, especially given increasing levels of noise,
would support interactivity as a viable candidate mechanism for
approximating optimal inference under uncertainty. However,
such a finding by itself would not suffice to address claims
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made by Norris et al. (2016) that activation feedback in IAMs is
qualitatively different from other forms of feedback; we address
this issue in the section “General Discussion.”
SIMULATIONS: FEEDBACK AND NOISE
We reexamined the role of feedback in TRACE (and, by
extension, other interactive models) by comparing word
recognition in TRACE with and without feedback, and under
levels of increasing noise. This allowed us to test the prediction
that feedback in interactive-activation models should make them
robust to noise (that is, feedback should allow the model to
maintain higher accuracy and speed as noise is added to inputs).
We also tested the generality of the FP98 failure to find a feedback
advantage without noise by testing every word in the standard,
211-word TRACE lexicon and every word in a new, larger, 907-
word lexicon (details described below). FP98 only tested 21 words
with homogenous characteristics (seven-phoneme words with
uniqueness point at phoneme position four), which had been
selected for other simulations. It is possible that these words were
not representative of the entire lexicon with respect to the effects
of feedback.
Although more than 30 years have passed since the
introduction of TRACE, it remains the model of speech
perception and spoken word recognition that accounts for the
broadest and deepest set of empirical phenomena (for reviews,
see Magnuson et al., 2012; Mirman, 2016). In addition to
phenomena that TRACE captured at its outset, such as categorical
perception and top-down lexical effects (McClelland and Elman,
1986), TRACE accounts for various phenomena that were
documented after TRACE first appeared, including fine-grained
time course indexed by eye tracking (Allopenna et al., 1998;
Dahan et al., 2001a,b) and mouse tracking (Spivey et al., 2005),
individual differences due to acquired (Mirman et al., 2011) and
developmental language disorders (McMurray et al., 2010), and
aspects of typical language development (Mayor and Plunkett,
2014). As a result, TRACE continues to be a central cognitive
model of spoken word recognition. As such, it offers the ideal
testbed for empirical evaluation of interactive activation as a
mechanism for robust word recognition under uncertainty.
Methods
Lexicons
FP98 developed a significantly larger lexicon than the original
TRACE lexicon in order to begin to test whether TRACE would
be robust as the lexicon size increases. We did not have access to
FP98’s expanded lexicon of 1,024 words, so we generated our own
based primarily on the procedures FP98 describe for compiling
a larger lexicon: we scanned a large electronic dictionary (20,000
words) for all items that could be transcribed using only TRACE’s
14 phonemes (/p/, /b/, /t/, /d/, /k/, /g/, /s/, /+/, /r/, /l/, /a/, /i/,
/u/, /ˆ/). This yielded approximately 500 words. Substituting /ˆ/
for schwa and /a/ for /æ/, and collapsing across vocalic and
consonantal liquids (substituting /l/ for vocalic /L/ and /r/ for
vocalic /R/) brought the total to 907. In the rest of this paper,
we will refer to this lexicon as biglex. For the sake of more
direct comparability with previous work, we also conducted all
simulations with the original 211-word TRACE lexicon, slex. This
allowed us to examine whether any patterns of results are an
artifact of scaling up the lexicon.
Readers may be concerned that biases of some sort may have
influenced the selection of words for the lexicons. We do not
think this is plausible. Consider the criteria McClelland and
Elman (1986) report for selecting the original 211 words.
TRACE . . . has detectors for the 211 words found in a
computerized phonetic word list that met all of the following
constraints: (a) the word consisted only of the phonemes listed
above; (b) it was not an inflection of some other word that
could be made by adding “-ed,” “-s,” or “-ing”; (c) the word
together with its “-ed,” “-s,” and “-ing” inflections occurred
with a frequency of 20 or more per million in the Kucˇera and
Francis (1967, p. 19) word count.
These criteria are quite generic, and there is no discernible bias
linking these selection criteria with those we described for biglex.
Both lexicons provide sufficiently large sampling from English
that we do not believe that any details of the results that follow
could be artifacts of item selection (although artifacts could arise
were we to use significantly smaller lexicons).
TRACE Parameters
We used the standard (McClelland and Elman, 1986) settings for
slex, but modified two parameters for biglex. FP98 reported that
changing the lexical inhibition parameter from the standard 0.030
to 0.025 and feedback from 0.030 to 0.015 improved performance
with a large lexicon; we used the FP98 adjusted parameters for
biglex. There are several reasons that we did not “re-explore” the
TRACE parameter space for our simulations. First, McClelland
and Elman (1986, p. 22) reported that changes to TRACE’s default
parameters changed the size and timing of some effects, but
broad ranges of values generated patterns of behavior similar to
those that they report in their series of simulations (p. 22), so
there is no reason to suspect that our findings depend critically
upon the default parameters. Second, TRACE has simulated
many additional findings since the original 1986 report (Strauss
et al., 2007; Magnuson et al., 2012, 2013, for reviews) using
the default slex lexicon and default parameters; deviations from
the default parameters with slex would require confirming that
TRACE could still account for all prior findings with the new
parameter settings. Finally, while FP98 adjusted the parameters
for a larger lexicon based on extensive explorations conducted by
Peeters (1989, Unpublished), we have also conducted our biglex
simulations with the default slex parameters and the results do
not differ qualitatively.
Noise
Gaussian noise was sampled from a normal distribution function
and added independently to each element of the input stimulus
vector for each time step (cf. McClelland, 1991). We created seven
levels of noise with mean of 0.0 and standard deviation ranging
from 0.0 to 1.5 in steps of 0.25. Our aim was to have noise values
that would impede the model very slightly at one end of the
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continuum and greatly at the other; as we shall see shortly, this
range of noise provided this.
Operationalizing Recognition
TRACE solves the phoneme and word segmentation problem
(how to parse a sequence into discrete phonemes at one level
and words at the next) by having copies of each phoneme and
word unit aligned at regular intervals over time (Figure 2). For
example, if the model is set up to process 33 time steps worth of
input, then there are 33 copies of the templates corresponding
to each word. There is one copy aligned with each of the
possible onsets of the word in the input (though note this is
the length of the memory “trace” constructed for the model;
the elements in that trace – e.g., the word units aligned at slice
4 – can continue processing beyond 33 time steps). Given this
reduplication, a modeler must decide how to interpret the bank
of word units. FP98 began by basing their interpretation on the
method McClelland and Elman (1986) used; one simply chooses
the units known to be aligned with the input. FP98 point out
that the unit immediately to the “right” of the perfectly aligned
unit (that is, the unit aligned with the following time step)
sometimes attains a high activation, and therefore they summed
the activation of the target unit perfectly aligned with the input
and the unit immediately following it. One must also decide
how to treat potential competitors. FP98 considered any units
overlapping in time with the target units to be competitors. FP98
then calculated response probabilities at each TRACE processing
step using the Luce (1959) choice rule:
Ri = e
kai∑
ekaj
(1)
where Ri is the response probability for item i, ai is that
item’s activation in TRACE, k is a constant (set to 20 in the
FP98 simulations) that controls target-competitor separation,
and the summed activations in the denominator include all target
and competitor units. In the FP98 simulations, an item was
considered “recognized” when its response probability exceeded
a threshold of 0.9.
We deviated from the FP98 procedure in a few ways. First,
we minimized selection criteria, allowing any word node to be
included; we did not preselect maximally aligned words nor limit
the set of potential competitors. One reason to preselect targets
is because of the large number of computations required to
FIGURE 2 | The TRACE reduplication architecture. At the bottom, featural input is replaced with squares indicating where the feature patterns corresponding to the
ordered phonemes of CAT occur in a sample utterance. Feature patterns activate phonemes aligned with them in the phoneme layer, where there are copies of each
phoneme are tiled over time. The copy maximally aligned with the /k/ features is strongly activated (indicated by its dark background). Adjacent copies overlap
partially and are partially activated. The same principles apply at the word layer, where the copy of CAT maximally aligned with the strongly aligned /k/, /æ/, and /t/
units is strongly activated, with graded activation of other CAT and ACT units depending on their degree of overlap. Note that because /t/ and /k/ share many
features, word units that overlap at offset with CAT still become moderately activated.
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compute response strength (R) for all copies of all words at every
time step (for example, with 33 copies of 211 words over 100 time
steps, the simulation of each word would require computing R for
211 × 211 × 33 × 100 = 146,919,300 values). An examination
of activation values revealed that typically only approximately
20–30 word units reached activations greater than 0.05, and word
units in this set were aligned with the first few time slices. We
conservatively reduced the set of units to include in the choice
rule to the top 50 units (rather than 20–30) from the first 10 time
slices in any simulation. Thus, for a given simulation, we only
computed R values for the 50 word units with the highest peak
activations (and computed R for those units over 100 time steps).
Note that this reduction is simply a convenience for data analysis;
all copies of all words were of course operational during the actual
simulations.
We then conducted simulations with slex and biglex to
find the combination of k and response probability accuracy
threshold that would maximize accuracy without noise and
without feedback. We found that the ideal combination (which
maximized hits and minimized false alarms) for both slex and
biglex was k set to 13 and response probability threshold set to 0.5.
Without noise and without feedback, these parameters yielded
proportions correct of 0.93 for slex and 0.92 for biglex (alternative
operational definitions for correct responses might allow higher
accuracy, but we chose this definition for the sake of simplicity).
Finding these maximizing values is a simple matter of calculating
proportion correct with a range of parameter combinations
(where simulations are scored as correct only when the target
and no other word exceeds the threshold). We examined a range
of 2–20 for k and from 0.01 to 0.99 for the response probability
threshold.
Simulation and Analysis Software
Initial simulations used jTRACE, a Java reimplementation
of the original TRACE C code1 (Strauss et al., 2007). For
purposes of speed (particularly with the larger lexicon), final
versions of simulations used the original C code with minor
modifications. Simulation results were processed using a series
of Perl preprocessing scripts and R analysis and plotting scripts.
Revised C code, Perl and R scripts are available from JSM, and
will soon be available from http://magnuson.psy.uconn.edu.
Procedure
Simulations were run in batches where every word in slex or
biglex was used once as the target. For each lexicon, we ran 14
batches of simulations: each of the seven levels of noise crossed
with feedback (set to the lexicon-appropriate parameter) or no
feedback. In each case, the decision rule described above was
applied and RT and accuracy were recorded. Simulations were
run for 100 cycles.2
1https://magnuson.psy.uconn.edu/jtrace/
2Without noise, most words in the lexicon were recognized well before cycle 95.
Thus, 100 cycles provided adequate time for recognition; accuracy would not
significantly increase at any feedback-x-noise level were we to run the simulations
for more cycles. The items that were not correctly recognized typically fell short
of the threshold and could never reach it (i.e., extending the simulation for more
processing cycles would not allow the target to reach the threshold).
Predictions
Recognition for Clear Inputs
FP98 reported that feedback appeared not to facilitate word
recognition in TRACE, since equal numbers of their 21
words were recognized more quickly without feedback as were
recognized more quickly with feedback. If feedback serves no
useful purpose, we should replicate this result when we examine
recognition of all words in slex (the original 211-word TRACE
lexicon) and biglex (our 907-word lexicon). If instead feedback
is generally helpful in TRACE, we should find that, on average,
words are recognized more quickly with feedback than without.
Recognition in Noise
Feedback allows integration of current input and prior
knowledge, not just in the explicit sense of top-down effects but
also in the implicit sense of optimal inference under uncertainty.
That is, feedback provides a generative model (cf. McClelland,
2013) meant to promote robust processing in cases of missing or
noisy inputs. Therefore, we make two predictions with respect
to noise-added inputs in TRACE. (1) Even if a general feedback
advantage on RT is not observed in noise-free inputs, we expect
one to emerge as noise levels increase. (2) We expect accuracy to
be better preserved with feedback than without.
Results
First, we examined average accuracy and RT with and without
feedback as noise increased for slex (top row, Figure 3)
and biglex (bottom row, Figure 3). For both lexicons, there
were clear average benefits of feedback: Feedback promoted
greater accuracy and faster RTs as noise was added. Next, we
examined the impact of feedback at the level of individual items.
Scatterplots for items in slex that were correctly recognized with
feedback on and feedback off at progressive levels of noise are
shown in Figure 4. Items recognized more quickly with feedback
are plotted below the identity line. Without noise (top left panel),
27% of words were recognized more quickly without feedback,
while the rest were recognized more quickly with feedback (57%),
or had equivalent RTs with and without feedback (16%). Thus,
without noise, feedback tends to speed up word recognition,
although a minority of items are recognized more quickly without
feedback.
As noise increases, the number of items included decreases
since we are only plotting items recognized correctly with and
without feedback. There is a clear trend for even more items
to be recognized more quickly with feedback than without as
noise increases. Figure 5 contains analogous plots for biglex.
The same trends are present: As noise increases, so does the
proportion of words recognized more quickly with feedback than
without.
It is unclear why some words are recognized more quickly
without feedback. Before considering why this might be the
case, it would be interesting to know whether those items tend
to benefit from feedback as noise is added. Figures 6 and 7
provide scatterplots relevant for this question for slex and biglex,
respectively. In both figures, the top left panel is restricted to
items that were recognized more quickly without feedback in the
absence of noise (hence, all points are above the identity line).
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FIGURE 3 | Accuracy (left) and RT (right) as a function of feedback level and noise in the original 211-word TRACE lexicon, slex (top) and the new 907-word lexicon,
biglex (bottom). Error bars span ±1 standard error (and are too small to be seen for some datapoints).
Subsequent panels are restricted to the “survivors” from these
subsets (that is, the items that were still recognized both with
and without feedback) as noise increased. Again, there is a clear
trend.3 As noise is added, feedback promotes faster recognition,
even for items that were recognized more slowly with feedback in
the absence of noise.
Discussion
In summary, feedback facilitates word recognition. On average,
feedback preserves accuracy and boosts recognition speed for
words presented in noise (Figure 3). At the level of specific
items, in the absence of noise, only a minority are recognized
3It is unclear what statistical tests would be appropriate for these data, given that we
have conducted simulations with every item in each lexicon. However, the trends
are clear and large.
more quickly without feedback than with feedback (most are
recognized more quickly or equally quickly with feedback). As
noise increases, a greater proportion of words are recognized
more quickly with than without feedback – even for words that
were recognized more quickly without feedback in the absence of
noise.
But why are any items recognized more slowly with feedback
than without? Again, in the absence of noise, recognition is slower
with feedback for 27% of words in slex and 36% of words in biglex.
In broad strokes, the effects of feedback on a word depend on (1)
recurrent lexical-phoneme-lexical boosts from lexical feedback
and (2) inhibition from other activated words. The feedback
boost can speed recognition, while inhibition can slow it. The fact
that feedback usually helps recognition implies that the boost is
usually more potent than increased competition resulting from
feedback.
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FIGURE 4 | Scatterplots of RTs for words recognized correctly with and without feedback in slex with no noise (top left) and progressively greater noise. The final
panel (bottom right) is missing because no words were recognized without feedback at the highest noise level (SD = 1.5). Points below the identity line are words
that were recognized more quickly with feedback than without; points above the identity line are words that were recognized more slowly with feedback than
without. Annotations indicate the percentages of words recognized more quickly with feedback, more slowly with feedback, or equivalently quickly with and without
feedback. At every noise level, the proportion of words recognized more quickly with feedback than without is greater than the proportion recognized more slowly
with feedback.
FIGURE 5 | Scatterplots of RTs for words recognized correctly with and without feedback in biglex with no noise (top left) and progressively greater noise. The
proportion of words recognized more quickly with feedback is greater than the proportion recognized more slowly with feedback at every noise level.
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FIGURE 6 | Scatterplots of RTs for words recognized correctly with and without feedback in slex, limited to words that were recognized more slowly with feedback
than without when no noise was added (top left). The final panel (bottom right) is missing because no words were recognized without feedback at the highest noise
level (SD = 1.5). On average, then, even words that exhibit a feedback disadvantage without noise show a benefit from feedback as noise increases.
FIGURE 7 | Scatterplots of RTs for words recognized correctly with and without feedback in biglex, limited to words that were recognized more slowly with feedback
than without when no noise was added (top left). As with slex (Figure 5), on average, even words that exhibit a feedback disadvantage without noise show a benefit
from feedback as noise increases.
In cases where there is no advantage with or without
feedback (16 and 25% with slex and biglex, respectively), the
feedback boost and feedback inhibition are in balance. For a
feedback disadvantage to occur the feedback boost must be
overwhelmed by increased competition – i.e., the boost must
help competitors more than the target, allowing them to send
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sufficient inhibition to the target to slow its recognition compared
to the no-feedback condition. Strauss (2006) used extensive
TRACE simulations to analyze the conditions under which this
occurs.
One way for a feedback disadvantage to occur is if a
short word is embedded in the target; for example, “cow” is
embedded in “couch.” When the model is presented with the
input “couch,” it must encounter the pattern corresponding to
“cow” first. TRACE exhibits a short-word advantage because
longer words have more sites for inhibition (words are only
inhibited by words that temporally overlap with or are adjacent
to them; Magnuson et al., 2013, for a review and detailed
explanation of activation and competition in TRACE). However,
we cannot appeal to embedding as a general principle to
explain feedback disadvantages: Many words with embeddings
still exhibit a feedback advantage. Rather, Strauss (2006)
found that a conspiracy of several factors appears to be
required. Feedback disadvantages tend to be observed when
two or more of the following hold: onset embeddings, negative
ganging, particular combinations of cohort size and target
length, and particular combinations of constituent phonemes.
We will focus on negative ganging here, as Strauss (2006)’s
simulations indicate that negative ganging is a key determinant
of feedback disadvantages and suggest that cohort size, target
length and phonetic saliency can modulate the size of negative
ganging effects but are themselves unlikely to drive feedback
disadvantages.
Negative ganging occurs when a target (e.g., clue) overlaps
partially with a “gang” of words that overlap with the target onset
but have greater mutual overlap within the gang (e.g., clock, clod,
clot all overlap with clue in the first two phonemes, but with each
other in the first three; see schematic in upper panel of Figure 8).
When the first phonemes of the target (e.g., /kl/) are presented,
the gang members are also activated. The target and the gang
all benefit from lexical feedback; when /kl/ has been presented,
those phonemes get a boost from feedback from the target and
the gang. However, the gang members also boost each other by
sending feedback to their mutual vowel (/⊃/, substituted with /a/
in TRACE), even though it has not been presented. This gives
these items an activation advantage over the target until enough
of the vowel in the input has been presented to allow the target
to overcome inhibition from the gang. It may help to visualize
this set of items in a tree structure, where clue and the /kl⊃/ gang
are on the same branch through the second consonant and then
branch apart at the vowel (lower panel of Figure 8). Since any
of these nodes in TRACE can inhibit each other, the gang effect
benefiting the clock–clot–clod branch allows the gang members
to inhibit items on the sparser branch where clue is located,
temporarily overwhelming benefits of feedback to the clue branch
and slowing recognition relative to the no-feedback condition.
Strauss (2006) found that whether negative ganging leads
to a feedback disadvantage depends further on the size
and composition of the target’s competitor neighborhood (in
particular, its cohort), the target’s length, and the amount of
overlap with the gang members. Gang effects are more likely to
be negative when the target is short, the cohort is large, and there
is a high degree of overlap among the gang members. However,
FIGURE 8 | Illustration of how feedback can occasionally hurt. As the system
“hears” clue, the initial /kl/ activates the “clock gang;” each word initially
overlapping with clock contributes to mutual reinforcement of the gang, and
each gang member temporarily inhibits clue. In the top panel, excitatory
connections (arrows) and inhibitory connections (filled circles) are illustrated
with a standard network diagram. In the lower panel, an implicit tree structure
based on partial overlap is illustrated. Although all the items are represented in
TRACE at the same level (as in the top panel), the tree structure illustrates the
overlap and embedding relationships that lead to gang effects.
we say “more likely” because the direction and magnitude of
gang effects depends on the other factors we mentioned above, as
well as the particular phonemes in the target and potential gangs
(see Strauss, 2006, for details). The small phoneme inventory
of TRACE leads to relatively dense packing of phonological
space, and the relative specificity of the different phonemes
varies. The degree of ganging depends on all the factors we have
discussed (and possibly additional ones). More generally, this
negative ganging effect is a type of phonotactic frequency effect –
one that flexibly reflects interactions between the structures of
the phoneme and lexical level inventories (rather than rigid
specifications of n-phone frequencies, i.e., diphones, triphones,
etc.). In other words, interactive activation provides a simple
mechanism that captures different orders of prior probabilities
at multiple scales.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Bayes’ theorem provides a simple formalism for optimal
integration of current input and prior knowledge for perceptual
and cognitive inference under uncertainty. Conceptually, the
theorem specifies a straightforward way to optimally estimate
the probability of an outcome given some evidence (that is, its
conditional probability, or the probability of the outcome given
the evidence) based upon the probability of the evidence given
the outcome and the independent probabilities of the outcome
and evidence (the probability of the outcome, whether or not the
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evidence is observed, and the probability of the evidence, whether
or not the outcome is observed). Numerous studies have shown
that cognitive systems approximate Bayesian inference (Clayards
et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2009; Chater et al., 2010; Sonderegger
and Yu, 2010; Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015). However, it
is unlikely that the human brain literally calculates Bayes’
theorem rather than approximating it in cases where optimal
or near-optimal performance is observed (Oaksford and Chater,
2007; Geisler and Ringach, 2009; Sanborn et al., 2010; McClelland
et al., 2014), so what are the cognitive (and neural) mechanisms
that produce Bayesian or Bayes-approximate behavior? One
candidate is interactive activation: bi-directional information
flow allows cognitive systems to flexibly learn to approximate
optimal integration of bottom-up input with top-down prior
knowledge (McClelland et al., 2014). One specific prediction from
this view is that top-down feedback should improve performance,
especially in noisy conditions. This prediction was challenged by
a set of simulations (FP98) that found no benefit of feedback –
a result that has played a key role in arguments that interactive
activation is not a viable implementation of Bayesian inference
in spoken word recognition (Norris et al., 2000, 2016). In this
paper, we re-evaluated this prediction using a systematic analysis
of spoken word recognition in the TRACE model (McClelland
and Elman, 1986) with and without feedback, and at varying
levels of noise.
When we examined the performance of TRACE on a large
number of items under clear and noisy conditions, feedback
clearly facilitated word recognition. Overall, feedback increased
speed and accuracy of word recognition for both clear and
noisy inputs. This invalidates the argument Norris et al. (2000)
made against interactive activation based on FP98 and supports
interactive activation as a viable cognitive (and perhaps neural)
mechanism for implementing Bayesian inference.
One might argue that TRACE with feedback turned off is
not a fair implementation of an autonomous model. In point
of fact, such a model would actually represent the largest
autonomous network model that has been implemented. The
Merge simulations Norris et al. (2000) report were conducted
with only six input phoneme nodes, four phoneme decision
nodes, and four word nodes, and no representation of sequential
order (so it would not be able to distinguish the words “cat,”
“act,” and “tack”). Thus, TRACE without feedback represents an
autonomous model able to operate with a relatively large lexicon
and phoneme inventory, while representing temporal order. The
model would not predict lexical effects on phoneme nodes.
Lexical effects on phoneme decisions are modeled in Merge
with special-purpose phoneme decision nodes. However, because
those phoneme decision nodes do not interact with phoneme or
word nodes, they are not relevant for modeling word recognition,
which was the aim of our simulations.
With clear evidence in hand for a helpful role of feedback
in interactive models, we turn next to several theoretical issues
raised by Norris et al. (2000, 2016). These issues are critical
because they form the core of the argument, advanced by Norris
et al. (2000), that feedback is not a viable cognitive algorithm
or, at best, feedback provides an inferior implementation of
Bayes’ theorem. We will address the relative parsimony of
interactive vs. autonomous models as framed by Norris et al.
(2000), whether feedback would hinder perceptual processing
(and related misconceptions of models like TRACE), growing
neural evidence supporting feedback, and varieties of feedback
that Norris et al. (2016) claim are acceptable and fundamentally
distinct from “activation feedback” in TRACE.
Occam’s Razor and the Feedback
Debate
Norris et al. (2000) motivate their arguments against feedback
on parsimony: “The principle of Occam’s razor instructs theorists
never to multiply entities unnecessarily” (p. 299). Another way of
framing Occam’s razor is to prefer the simpler of two explanations
that account for the same data. How do we determine simplicity?
In the case of neural network models, intuitive bases for
comparison are the numbers of nodes and connections. Let’s
begin with Merge and the sort of simplified IAM Norris et al.
(2000) compared. The elements of the models are nodes and
connections. Figure 9 presents an elaborated version of Figure 1,
depicting nodes and connections in simple versions of Merge and
an IAM with three phonemes and four words.
The first thing to note is that Merge requires more nodes and
connections than an equivalently simplified IAM; in Figure 9,
these added nodes are shaded gray, and the added connections
are depicted with dotted lines. Let P be the number of phonemes,
W the number of words, L mean word length (mean phonemes
per word). Merge has 2P +W nodes; the IAM has P +W nodes.
The extra P nodes in Merge are the phoneme decision nodes.4
Both models have P! / [2(P − 2)!] + L! / [2(L − 2)!] inhibitory
connections. The IAM has 2WL excitatory connections (one
feedforward and one feedback connection for every phoneme-
to-word link). Merge has this number of connections but
an additional P connections (from phoneme input nodes to
phoneme decision nodes; see also the caveat in footnote 3). Thus,
just based on a basic complexity comparison, the models are
not equivalently simple; the IAM requires fewer nodes and fewer
connections.
Dashed lines in Figure 9 indicate connections that afford
feedback in the IAM but feed “sideways” to phoneme decision
nodes in Merge. We say “sideways” because the phoneme
decision nodes are a set of terminals; the layer of decision
nodes has no purpose except to integrate bottom-up and top-
down information without allowing “feedback activation.” Norris
et al. (2000) note that phoneme decision nodes allow Merge
to be a “multiple outlet” system (Cutler et al., 1987) and have
suggested that it is a problem that models like TRACE do not
have explicit nodes for phoneme decisions. As such, they present
a strong theoretical commitment that phoneme-level and lexical-
level information is not merged for any functional purpose except
for metalinguistic decisions about phonemes. By contrast, in
TRACE (as in virtually all connectionist models), it is assumed
that attention can be directed to phoneme or lexical levels when
4We are assuming a static layer of decision nodes for mathematical convenience.
Norris et al. (2000) indicate that decision nodes would instead by wired-up
as needed. The machinery for doing this on-the-fly wiring would require an
unspecified amount of additional elements, making the difference in model
elements (nodes and connections) even greater.
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FIGURE 9 | Elaborated schematics of Merge and an equivalently simplified interactive activation model (IAM) for purposes of comparing model complexity in terms
of numbers of nodes and connections. Arrows and knobs indicate excitatory and inhibitory connections, respectively. Dashed lines indicate excitatory connections
that provide lexical feedback in the IAM but feed forward (or “sideways”) to phoneme decision nodes in Merge. Gray nodes indicate additional nodes required by
Merge, and dotted lines indicate additional connections required by Merge. As discussed in the text, feedback connections in the IAM provide emergent prelexical
sensitivity to phonotactics; such sensitivity in Merge would require a tremendous proliferation of connections. Thus, the obviously more compact IAM model provides
all functionality the larger Merge model does while providing phonotactic sensitivity as an emergent property. Note that neither of these networks would be valid
models of spoken word recognition, as they cannot encode temporal order (e.g., CAT, ACT, and TACK would all be equally activated by the input strings /kæt/,
/ækt/, or /tæk/, as well as by /ætk/, /ktæ/ or /tkæ/). This remains a problem for the Merge model. Differences in complexity may be even greater in systems that
address this dilemma.
decisions are required about one or the other; the Luce (1959)
choice rule is typically applied to activations to make such
decisions. If, as Norris et al. (2000) posit, nodes cannot serve the
dual purpose of processing and decisions (i.e., if nodes cannot
be read-out unless they are designated as decision nodes), any
functional level one wishes to link to explicit behavior will require
appending a layer of decision nodes (i.e., Merge requires a layer
of word decision nodes, as would any other model). But note
that there is still no mechanism built into decision nodes that
“reads” activations in order to execute a decision; a choice process
(e.g., applying the Luce choice rule, or applying a simple winner-
take-all rule of choosing the decision corresponding to the most
active node) still must be added. Thus, this is not a point of true
difference in models.
Furthermore, there are also aspects of Merge that are not
included in Figure 9 (and so far as we are aware, have never
been implemented). Phonotactic sensitivity emerges in an IAM
like TRACE thanks to lexical feedback; the more words there
are that contain a particular multi-phoneme pattern, the more
feedback resonance will accumulate for that pattern. (For neural
evidence that phonotactic sensitivity arises from lexical feedback,
see Gow and Olson, 2015.) Norris et al. (2000) have appealed to
the possibility of building in various kinds of prior phonotactic
knowledge in the forward connections from phonemes to words
or via lateral connections within the phoneme input layer. This
would allow Merge to have sensitivity to phonotactics at multiple
scales without feedback. For example, to account for lexically
mediated compensation-for-coarticulation, McQueen (2003)
speculated that transitional probabilities of different orders
(diphones, triphones, etc.) could be wired into the phoneme
layer of a model like Merge. Although the mechanism for adding
transitional probability connections to Merge has never been
specified, even adding first-order (diphone) connections would
require P2-P connections (1,560 connections for 40 phonemes).
Adding triphones would require P3–P2 connections (62,400
connections for 40 phonemes). Quadraphones (a possibility not
excluded by McQueen’s speculations) would require 2,496,000
connections for 40 phonemes. Higher-order n-phones or more
complex possibilities (e.g., diphones conditioned on n-phones)
would obviously expand the number of connections even further.
Given the increase in model elements required by autonomous
architectures, how is Merge simpler? Norris et al. (2000) assert
that feedback is inherently illogical and complex. For example,
Norris et al. (2000) say:
The logic of the process requires information to flow in one
direction: from sounds to words. This direction of information
flow is unavoidable and necessary for a speech recognition
model to function (p. 299).
And Norris et al. (2016) assert:
Feedback performing Bayesian computations may be
considered unobjectionable; however, it is incontrovertibly
simpler to perform those same computations without feedback
(p. 5).
We reject the assertions that feedback is illogical or that
feedback “incontrovertibly” imposes unspecified complexity
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(that is, complexity that cannot be quantified by, e.g.,
enumerating nodes and connections). Norris et al. (2016)
do not present or cite mathematical principles to support these
assertions and deny the logical implications of the abundance
of feedback connections in neural systems (see section “Neural
Data Relevant to the Feedback Debate” below). Without a
case that interaction is more complex based on model size
or computational principles, their claims rest completely
on the argument that feedback cannot benefit perception
and that feedback in fact will hinder perception. Given our
demonstrations of a helpful role of feedback, we turn next to the
question of whether feedback in a model like TRACE hinders
perception.
Does Feedback Hinder Perception?
Norris (1994) and Norris et al. (2000, 2016) have repeatedly
claimed that feedback in TRACE leads the model to “hallucinate.”
Here is a representative passage from Norris et al. (2000).
If the /n/ in the middle of phoneme cannot be distinguished
clearly by the phoneme level alone, interactive bias from the
lexical level can boost the activation for the /n/ and make it
more likely that the phoneme will be identified. Of course, if
the input were the non-word phomeme instead, the biasing
effect would impair performance rather than help it, in that
the mispronunciation would be overlooked. That is, interactive
bias models run the risk of hallucinating. Particularly when the
input is degraded, the information in the speech input will tend
to be discarded and phonemic decisions may then be based
mainly on lexical knowledge (p. 302).
As we have reviewed elsewhere (Magnuson et al., 2012, 2013),
Figures 6, 7, 13 and 30 of the original TRACE paper (McClelland
and Elman, 1986) show that TRACE balances top-down and
bottom-up information such that the model exhibits bottom-up
priority. A key example in the original paper was based on plug-
blug-?lug (that is, a word [plug], a similar non-word beginning
with /b/, and a stimulus with the first segment ambiguous
between /p/ and /b/). We can extrapolate to the example of
“phomeme:” The word “phoneme” would be highly activated
given this input, but less so than when given “phoneme.” Input
will not “tend to be discarded” nor will “the mispronunciation
. . . be overlooked,” as activations at the phoneme level will
clearly reflect the competing influences of bottom-up and top-
down activations (/n/ will become much more active than it
would in a case where it was not favored by a lexical entry, e.g.,
numb/none, and while /m/ would be strongly activated, and in
particular, much more so than it would be given a clear input of
“phoneme,” it would be less activated than it would be by a clear
bottom-up input corresponding to /m/). Mirman et al. (2005)
examined this specific issue closely. They found that feedback
in TRACE could not overwhelm bottom-up input but could
delay recognition of lexically inconsistent phonemes when there
is some bottom-up ambiguity, as in the ‘phomeme’ case, where
the similarity between lexically consistent /n/ and acoustically
present /m/ creates sufficient bottom-up ambiguity for the top-
down feedback to delay recognition of the /m/. Experiments with
human subjects confirmed lexically induced delays in phoneme
recognition under the conditions predicted by TRACE.
In the quote above, another misconception about interactive
activation is highlighted in the notion that the effect of feedback
will only be to boost the activation of /n/ given “phomeme”
as input. Norris et al. (2016) similarly claim that “in TRACE,
activation is fed back via top-down connections to simply boost
the activation of nodes at an earlier level” (pp. 9–10). However,
due to lateral inhibition and subsequent inter-layer resonance,
boosting one phoneme has myriad, complex effects. The idea
that feedback simply boosts activations of lexically consistent
phonemes oversimplifies the actual dynamics of an IAM.
The hallucination claim also implicitly underestimates the
propensity for misperceptions in human listeners. In fact,
there is a close concordance between TRACE’s tendency to
“hallucinate” lexically consistent phonemes and the tendencies
in misperceptions by human listeners in a study of lexically
induced phoneme inhibition (Mirman et al., 2005). This
finding is consistent with other examples of context-induced
misperceptions, such as to failures to detect mispronunciations
(Cole, 1973; Marslen-Wilson and Welsh, 1978), phoneme
restoration (Samuel, 1981, 1996, 1997), and related findings in
other domains, such as illusory contours in visual perception
(Lee and Nguyen, 2001). It is crucial to recognize the distinction
between optimal performance (the best possible under particular
conditions) and perfect performance. The benefit of feedback
is to approximate optimal use of context-appropriate prior
knowledge. The present simulations showed that feedback can
indeed slow word recognition, but this happens under particular
conditions (embedded words, negative gang effects, etc.) when
prior knowledge conflicts with bottom-up input. As in the case
of lexically induced delays in phoneme recognition (Mirman
et al., 2005), these cases of feedback hindering perception are not
valid arguments against feedback because they are consistent with
Bayesian integration of bottom-up input and prior probability:
When the input conflicts with prior knowledge, perception
should be more difficult. McClelland et al. (2014; also Movellan
and McClelland, 2001) demonstrated that it is possible to
balance feedforward and feedback gain to avoid hallucination and
produce optimal (Bayesian) performance. The tradeoff between
potential misperceptions and positive benefits of feedback must
be balanced through proper weighting of bottom-up and top-
down information sources – as it is in TRACE.
Neural Data Relevant to the Feedback
Debate
Norris et al. (2016) have argued that in general, neural-level data
does not bear heavily on the feedback question because
. . . in a theory stated at what Marr (1982) would term
‘computational’ or ‘algorithmic’ levels of analysis, there might
be no need for feedback between different stages of processing,
even though the requirement to implement the processing
computations in neural tissue might best be served by
exploiting recurrent connections between layers of neurons . . .
an algorithmic account with no feedback would not need to
be altered in the light of evidence of the existence of recurrent
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neural connections, so long as those neurons were just part of
the implementation of that algorithm (p. 4).
Certainly, the presence of recurrent connections in the
brain may be compatible with multiple computational accounts,
including those that do not include feedback. However, a number
of recent studies have provided compelling neuroscientific
evidence that may be able to inform the feedback debate at
the computational and algorithmic levels of analysis. Myers and
Blumstein (2008), for example, examined brain activity related
to the classic Ganong (1980) effect. In this effect, phoneme
categorization of a word-initial ambiguous token (e.g., between
/g/ and /k/) is modulated by the lexical context (e.g., in –iss versus
–ift). In a functional MRI experiment, Myers and Blumstein
showed that the Ganong effect modulated neural activity in
the bilateral superior temporal gyri (STG), as well as in the
left middle frontal gyrus and in the left cingulate. The STG
have long been associated with low-level acoustic processing
(for a review, see Hickok and Poeppel, 2007), whereas frontal
and medial structures are often implicated in decision-making
processes (Krawczyk, 2002). Myers and Blumstein argued that
the specific pattern of STG activation in their data reflected
integration of lexical and acoustic-phonetic information. They
further noted that under a strictly feedforward architecture,
lexical context would not influence activation in early auditory
areas. Norris et al. (2016) have argued that this conclusion
in favor of interactive models presupposes that the STG is
involved only in prelexical processing and point to fMRI evidence
ascribing additional roles (e.g., in lexical processing) for the
STG. But indeed, Myers and Blumstein argue that the most
likely situation is that the STG is involved in both lexical and
prelexical processing; what makes their data inconsistent with
autonomous architectures is the fact that STG activation is not
related to decision difficulty (e.g., Binder et al., 2004; Blumstein
et al., 2005; Myers et al., 2009). Similar effects of semantically
biased sentence contexts on phoneme perception (Borsky et al.,
1998) have been tied to the left STG (Davis et al., 2011; Guediche
et al., 2013), consistent with interactive accounts of speech
perception.
Still, lexical processing occurs on a millisecond timescale,
and the temporal resolution of fMRI may be inadequate to
examine whether activation at the lexical level changes activation
at the phoneme level (Hernandez et al., 2002; Spivey, 2016).
Results from techniques that allow for both fine-grained spatial
and temporal resolution provide even stronger evidence of
feedback (Gow et al., 2008; Travis et al., 2013; Gow and Olson,
2016; Leonard et al., 2016). Leonard et al. (2016), for instance,
conducted an electrocorticography (ECoG) study in which they
directly recorded cortical responses to unambiguous speech
(e.g., faster [fæstr], factor [fæktr]) and to speech in which the
disambiguating token was replaced with noise (e.g., [fæ#tr]).
Participants tended to perceive the ambiguous stimuli in a
bi-stable fashion, sometimes reporting having heard one word
and sometimes having heard the other. Critically, when the
participant perceived the ambiguous stimulus as one word (e.g.,
faster), the cortical response in the STG at ∼120 ms post-
stimulus onset matched the STG response to a clear production
of that word at that same time. That is, the online response
in the STG to the same acoustic input differed depending on
how that instance of the stimulus was perceived. Leonard et al.
(2016) also created filters that mapped from cortical patterns
of activity to spectrograms; these filters were created based on
passive listening to clear productions of speech and then fit to
the ECoG data from the main experiment. The spectrograms
derived from the ECoG data in the ambiguous condition
closely matched the spectrogram for the clear production of
the item that the participant perceived. Finally, Leonard et al.
(2016) reported that the pattern of cortical activity prior to the
presentation of the ambiguous stimulus predicted a subject’s
perception on that trial and that this “pre-stimulus neural
bias” (i.e., set of prior expectations) was heavily associated
with the left inferior frontal gyrus, an area associated with
higher level aspects of cognition. Strictly feedforward models
would posit neither the pattern of activation in the STG nor
that prior expectations would restore intact perception of a
stimulus.
Taken together, these findings offer compelling neural
evidence that is readily explainable through interactive
architectures but not apparently compatible with purely
feedforward accounts. On our view, these sorts of neural data
should inform theories at other levels of processing in Marr’s
(1982) hierarchy. Consider again the claim by Norris et al. (2016)
that neural evidence for activation feedback would not require
alteration of an algorithmic (or presumably, computational) level
theory that rejects feedback.
Encapsulation of computational and/or algorithmic theory is
problematic for several reasons (Cooper and Peebles, 2015). For
example, if neural evidence is irrelevant to computational-level
accounts, behavioral evidence may also be irrelevant (Griffiths
et al., 2008). After all, human behavior is subject to all sorts
of performance factors that might just be side-effects of one
of many possible algorithms or implementations (this will be
familiar to readers acquainted with the competence-performance
distinction in linguistics, e.g., Chomsky, 1965 vs. Seidenberg,
1997). More importantly, Marr’s (1982) proposal was that a
complete explanation requires an account at all three levels of
analysis – computational, algorithmic, and implementational.
Thirty-five years later, after substantial progress at each of the
levels, we have opportunities to develop theories that bridge levels
of analysis: theories that specify the computation, the algorithm
for making that computation, and the neural implementation of
that algorithm. We agree with Oaksford and Chater (2007) that
even comprehensive rational theoretical accounts will need to be
constrained by evidence for the details of algorithms and neural
implementation. Each level should constrain the others as we
approach comprehensive and biologically plausible explanations,
resulting in a multi-level theory rather than independent theories
at each level. Interactive activation is one such multi-level
theory: At the computational level it is Bayesian inference (or
Bayes approximate, depending on details); at the algorithmic
level, mappings are achieved through complex interactions of
simple elements with forward, backward, and lateral connections;
and it relates at the implementational level directly to neural
feedback.
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Good Online Feedback, Bad Online
Feedback
At issue in the interactivity debate is whether there is feedback
from higher levels of processing that influences the activation
levels of lower layers during online processing. As such, Norris
et al. (2016) have argued that there are other types of feedback
that are compatible with their perspective, including feedback
for learning, feedback for attentional control, feedback for
“binding” (based on an argument that it is necessary for
lower levels of representation to explicitly encode parsing that
emerges at higher levels5), generative models, and predictive
coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999).6 More generally, they say that
“feedback performing Bayesian computations may be considered
unobjectionable” (p. 10) but add that “it is incontrovertibly
simpler to perform those same computations without feedback” –
a considerable shift from the strong position that feedback cannot
possibly help.
Norris et al. (2016) further cite examples of systems that
operate without feedback, such as deep learning networks for
speech recognition (Hinton et al., 2012), as if to suggest that
if such systems operate without online feedback, then feedback
is unnecessary. When they cite Hinton et al. (2012), they say
“the best current automatic speech recognition systems are feed-
forward” (p. 5). They do not mention that in the system described
by Hinton et al. (2012), as in many deep learning systems,
there are phases of training that employ feedback, and not just
“feedback for learning” (that is, backpropagation of error); these
systems use what Norris et al. (2016) call “activation feedback”
during training. Norris et al. (2016) later acknowledge this
regarding a related system (Hinton et al., 2006) and conclude that
“feedback may sometimes be necessary to learn a code but, once
established, that code can be used without feedback” (p. 12; note
that the feedback at issue here is again “activation feedback”).
5Norris et al. (2016) give the example of phonemic input /haidI@r/, which can be
parsed as “hi dear,” “hide ear,” or “hide deer.” They claim that a sublexical level of
representation must be informed of the parse that results (“the word dear. . . does
not ‘know’ which phonemes activated it . . . If there are no backward connections,
then there is no way of forming an integrated percept of the word dear and its
constituent phonemes. In order to form such a percept the phonemes need to be
bound to the word, and this requires some form of bi-directional communication”
(p. 8). We find this suggestion to be at odds with the vast majority of computational
cognitive and neuroscience, where there is no need for such discrete identification
at lower levels of encoding. In a model like TRACE or Shortlist, without any such
“feedback for binding,” the system will settle on a lexical parse based on, e.g., word
frequency and (in the case of TRACE) probabilistic phonotactics that emerge from
lexical-phonemic feedback.
6Norris et al. (2016) have claimed that Simple Recurrent Networks (SRNs; Elman,
1991) do not include online, interactive feedback. However, the input to the hidden
units at any time step is the current bottom-up input and the results of hidden
unit processing of bottom-up and context information from the previous time step
transformed by trained context-to-hidden weights. One could argue that this does
not qualify as feedback, as it is not literally feedback from explicit lexical units.
However, if hidden units influence their own inputs, then there is no sense in which
the bottom-up input to the hidden units is encapsulated from the top-down input
from the context units; the hidden unit activations cannot be unmixed to identify
which portion of the input came from bottom-up inputs or context units (without
knowing both the values of connection weights and the activations of the inputs
and context units). To claim that the hidden unit states do not constitute feedback
because they are only a partial result of the process that yields lexical activations
does not accurately represent the dynamics of SRNs.
Indeed, learning is a key concern. Friston (2003) argues
that for any system that is “not easily invertible” (one where
there is a many-to-many mapping from inputs to outputs, as
in spoken language), a feedforward solution is possible but will
be nearly impossible to discover without supervised learning or
feedback. Friston (2003) describes “empirical Bayes,” a variant
of Bayesian learning in which higher levels in hierarchically
organized representations provide provisional prior probabilities
for lower levels via feedback – even when the higher-level
representations are imprecise early in learning (see Magnuson,
2008, for a more detailed discussion of Friston’s arguments and
their implications for the interaction debate, and Grossberg, 2003,
for related arguments).
One way to construe feedback in interactive-activation
models is that it makes the models implicit Bayesians. For
example, McClelland (1991) and Movellan and McClelland
(2001) show how stochastic interactive models provide optimal
integration of context and bottom-up stimulation (see also
Grossberg, 2003, for strong arguments regarding the need for
resonance/interaction/feedback to account for perception in
multiple domains, and a review of neurophysiological findings
demonstrating top-down effects and connectivity at multiple
levels of neural systems). The addition of feedback gives the
model early and continuous access to dynamic, context-sensitive
prior probabilities at multiple windows of analysis without
explicit representations of the probabilities. For example, as
discussed above, transitional probabilities will emerge as a
function of the structure of lexical neighborhoods: The more
words that contain a particular sequence, the more feedback
the component phonemes of that sequence receive. In the case
of weak bottom-up information (e.g., due to a low amplitude
input signal or the presence of noise), feedback will help. Given
roughly equivalent evidence for two sublexical alternatives, if one
is contained in a word and the other is not, or one is contained
in more words than the other, feedback will push the system
toward the more frequent (likely) alternative. Given roughly
equivalent bottom-up information for two lexical alternatives,
if one has a higher prior probability (either in terms of lexical
frequency [Dahan et al., 2001a, for implementations of frequency
in TRACE] or sublexical frequencies implicit in the lexicon), this
will be reflected in greater feedback and will push the system to
favor the alternative more consistent with prior knowledge.
McClelland (2013) and McClelland et al. (2014) have
demonstrated how an IAM can be made fully Bayes-consistent
by allowing sublexical nodes to keep track of their contribution
to lexical activation and to remove that contribution from the
feedback they receive.7 Norris et al. (2016) claim that adding such
a mechanism “adds an assumption to the core set of interactive-
activation assumptions” and therefore “Interactive activation,
with its activation feedback, can thus be viewed as the wrong
place to start in model development. All we actually need is
7Note that McClelland (1991) and Movellan and McClelland (2001) have shown
how variants of interactive activation models with continuous activation (that are
made non-deterministic by adding noise to model inputs or internal layers) –
and without a mechanism for nodes to deduct their self-contributions to their
own feedback – can approximate (or under certain conditions are equivalent to)
Bayesian inference (as demonstrated by their ability to exhibit logistic additivity).
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Bayes” (p. 9). But that is not quite all, because on their account,
we also need feedback for learning, plus feedback for binding,
plus feedback for attentional control, plus feedback for predictive
coding. Adding a mechanism to remove a node’s contribution
to feedback it receives, as Khaitan and McClelland (2010),
McClelland (2013), and McClelland et al. (2014) have proposed,
is principled (consistent, e.g., with constraints on unidirectional
causal graphs [Pearl, 1982; see McClelland, 2013, for discussion]).
It is not a radical reconceiving of interaction. It is an example of
standard scientific practice in model development (and again, it is
not the only way to make a model like TRACE Bayes-equivalent).
While we think the designation of “activation feedback” as
a separate category of feedback distinct from the others in
the Norris et al. (2016) list of “unobjectionable feedback” is in
error, if we return to the question of parsimony, it seems that
the arguments in favor of online feedback continue to accrue.
Recall that feedback in TRACE provides emergent phonotactic
sensitivity, which would have to be added in an as-yet unspecified
manner in Merge or either Shortlist model, possibly requiring a
rather dramatic increase in connections (as we discussed above),
or other elements that would increase complexity in the case of
a computational-level Bayesian model like Shortlist B (Norris
and McQueen, 2008). Furthermore, many of the “variants” of
feedback that Norris et al. (2016) find unobjectionable would be
accommodated by the type of feedback implemented in a typical
IAM like TRACE. Lexical feedback provides a natural pathway
for attentional modulation. Lexical feedback actually provides a
rough approximation to the “feedback for binding,” Norris et al.
(2016) suggest is needed (though we disagree with the need for
the explicit and complete top-down “binding,” Norris et al. (2016)
describe as necessary; see footnote 5); in TRACE, the words most
activated at the lexical level will continuously push phoneme
activations toward the sequence of phonemes most consistent
with the emergent parse at the lexical level.
But finally, consider the formal contribution of feedback in
a model like TRACE. As McClelland (2013) discusses in detail,
feedback provides a generative model. A word node sending
feedback to its constituent phonemes is a case of a higher-level
element sending top-down feedback to its “inferred” (embodied)
causes (the specific phoneme nodes that would activate the
word node). Even the original, deterministic implementation of
TRACE will come close to approximating an optimal Bayesian
analyzer (Movellan and McClelland, 2001; McClelland, 2013);
lexical representations encode sublexical patterns of varying grain
sizes that guide the system as a whole toward the most likely cause
of a particular input pattern. Given noisy input that is consistent
with two sublexical patterns, one of which occurs in one or more
lexical items but the other of which does not occur (e.g., a segment
midway between /s/ and /+/ preceding /tr/, where /str/ is a likely
sequence in English but /+tr/ is not), lexical feedback provides a
generative model that guides the system to a rational response
given the input and top-down knowledge about likely patterns
embodied in the lexicon.
Quod Feedback?
Our simulations demonstrate how feedback can help recognition
(see also McClelland et al., 2006 and the resulting debate
between McQueen et al., 2006, and Mirman et al., 2006; and
McClelland et al., 2014). Norris et al. (2016) argue that this
debate has been effectively resolved by the development of
Bayesian models of perception and cognition. However, short
of committing to a cognitive (and neural) mechanism that
literally calculates Bayesian posterior probabilities, the question
remains: how are such computations implemented in the minds
and brains of actual humans? While Norris et al. (2016) claim
that humans are literally ideal observers (that is, we perform
optimal perception), the conventional ideal observer approach
(e.g., Geissler, 2003) is to assess what an optimal system
would achieve for a given stimulus and to compare biological
performance to the ideal – with the assumptions that a biological
system may approximate the ideal and that differences between
biological performance and the ideal may provide insights into
the mechanisms supporting biological perception (which may or
may not be Bayes-approximate or Bayes-equivalent) and other
relevant details (such as degree of internal noise). We believe
that feedback is a strong candidate for implementing Bayesian
computations at multiple levels of analysis.
First, let us be clear about the term “feedback,” given that
Norris et al. (2016) have suggested there are at least six types of
feedback.
(1) Activation feedback
(2) Attentional modulation
(3) Feedback for learning
(4) Feedback for binding
(5) Feedback in service of generative models
(6) Error signals fed back in predictive coding
Of these, they find objectionable only “activation feedback”:
the ability for one level of a hierarchical network to alter the states
of inferior levels during processing. As formulated by Norris et al.
(2000, 2016), the arguments against feedback were:
(1) Feedback from level L to an inferior level cannot improve
performance at level L compared to a system without
feedback.
(2) Not only can feedback not help, it hinders perception by
causing hallucination.
(3) A system without feedback is more parsimonious than
a model with feedback because (a) logically, information
should only feed forward (Norris et al., 2000, p. 299) and
(b) “it is incontrovertibly simpler to perform [the] same
computations without feedback” (Norris et al., 2016, p. 5).
We have responded to all three of these claims. To summarize:
(1) Feedback improves performance. Our simulations
demonstrate large, robust advantages for feedback,
especially when noise is added to inputs for TRACE.
(2) Feedback does not entail “hallucination.” Both formal
analysis (McClelland et al., 2014) and empirical testing
(Mirman et al., 2005) demonstrate that interactive
activation models in general, and the TRACE model in
particular, appropriately balance bottom-up and top-down
information. Such models do not “discard” bottom-up
input in favor of feedback-consistent perception (see our
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above of examples from the original TRACE paper, e.g.,
Figures 6, 7, 13, and 30 from McClelland and Elman,
1986); however, prior knowledge can hinder recognition of
input that violates expectations – consistent with Bayesian
inference.
(3) A system with feedback is more parsimonious than
a model without feedback. As we detailed, based on
simple enumeration of required nodes and connections,
an interactive model is simpler than an autonomous
analog. An interactive model would also account for
substantially more phenomena, because lexical feedback
provides emergent sensitivity to phonotactics, and other
forms of prior probability that would have to be somehow
added in feedforward connections in models like Merge
(Norris et al., 2000). Considering the six types of feedback,
connections providing lexical feedback could do at least
quadruple duty, providing the pathway for attentional
modulation, binding, and already embodying a generative
model (cf. McClelland, 2013), in addition to providing
activation feedback. All of these mechanisms would have
to be somehow added to autonomous models. Parsimony
clearly favors feedback.
The autonomy position has shifted from “feedback is
never necessary” and “feedback cannot improve processing”
to, essentially, feedback of any sort except activation feedback
can be helpful (“These forms of feedback [attentional, learning,
binding] either are necessary for perception to be successful, or
can make perception more efficient,” Norris et al., 2016, p. 8).
Norris et al. (2016) even allow that activation feedback may be
helpful for learning (Friston, 2003; Serre et al., 2007); though they
still maintain that it should be turned off at some unspecified
point. Our simulations show that feedback promotes robust
performance in the face of noise – an important piece of the
broader mosaic showing that feedback provides a parsimonious
mechanism for implementation of Bayesian inference.
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